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Revista de Cercetare și Interventie Sociala

ISSN: 1583-3410 (print), ISSN: 1584-5397 (electronic)

EXPLORING JOHN SEARLE'S ANALYSIS OF INTENTIONAL SATISFACTION: SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY

Mei LAN, Yumin SHI, You ZHANG

Revista de cercetare și intervenție socială, 2024, vol. 86, pp. 111-126

<https://doi.org/10.33788/rcis.86.9>

Published by:
Expert Projects Publishing House



On behalf of:
„Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University,
Department of Sociology and Social Work
and
HoltIS Association

Exploring John Searle's Analysis of Intentional Satisfaction: Sociological Implications for the Concept of Intentionality

Mei LAN¹, Yumin SHI², You ZHANG³

Abstract

This paper delves into the concept of intentionality, which is deeply ingrained in the representation of consciousness, and its significance in comprehending human behavior and societal dynamics. Specifically, it examines John Searle's analysis of intentional satisfaction and contrasts it with the theory of Intentionality put forth by Husserl. Searle's perspective, particularly his exploration of conditions of satisfaction and intentional consciousness, sheds light on the intersection of the mind and reality. At the heart of Searle's framework lies the crucial connection between intentional satisfaction and causal experience, advocating for a naturalistic philosophical standpoint. By delving into these intricacies, the paper aims to uncover sociological implications for comprehending intentionality within the framework of social structures and interactions. Searle's examination of intentional satisfaction offers insights into how individuals attribute meaning to their actions and experiences, shaping their understanding of the world around them. Furthermore, by juxtaposing Searle's ideas with Husserl's theory, the paper highlights the diverse philosophical perspectives on intentionality and underscores the complexity of this concept. Moreover, by exploring the relationship between intentional satisfaction and causal experience, Searle's framework suggests a nuanced understanding of the mechanisms underlying human behavior. This understanding not only enriches philosophical discourse but also has profound implications for fields such as psychology and sociology. In conclusion, this paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on intentionality by offering a comparative analysis of Searle's perspective with that of Husserl, while also emphasizing the sociological implications of understanding intentionality within social contexts.

¹ Department of Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, 230026, CHINA; The School of Foreign Languages and Cultures, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, 621010, CHINA. E-mail: lanmei@mail.ustc.edu.cn

² Department of Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, CHINA. E-mail: lauralanmei@163.com

³ The School of Marxism, Chengdu University, Chengdu, 610106, CHINA. E-mail: zhlgye@163.com (Corresponding author).

Through this exploration, we gain deeper insights into the intricate dynamics of consciousness representation and its role in shaping human behavior and societal interactions.

Keywords: intentionality; state of affairs; causality; conditions of satisfaction; sociology.

Introduction

Intentionality serves as a foundational concept in both the European phenomenological tradition and the contemporary philosophy of mind prevalent in Britain and America. Within Western philosophical discourse, there's a growing inclination to reexamine consciousness as a means to address longstanding philosophical inquiries. In this pursuit, both traditions converge on a common theme: Intentionality. Central to John Searle's analysis of Intentionality lies a crucial yet often overlooked concept — that of satisfaction. Searle himself underscores this notion, asserting that "The key to understanding representation is the conditions of satisfaction." (Searle, 1983) Throughout his academic career, Searle consistently emphasizes that "In general, intentionality is the representation of conditions of satisfaction." Hence, an investigation into intentional satisfaction becomes paramount for a comprehensive grasp of Searle's Intentionality. This paper aims to delineate the sociological implications of Searle's analysis, particularly in relation to intentional satisfaction. By juxtaposing Searle's perspective with Husserl's theory of Intentionality, we elucidate the unique aspects of Searle's framework, especially concerning conditions of satisfaction (Searle, 2004). Additionally, we delve into the implications of satisfaction within intentional consciousness and explore its role in bridging the gap between the mind and the real world, thus uncovering the sociological dimensions inherent in Searle's conception of Intentionality (Searle, 1980).

Intentionality is the most fundamental concept obtained by Searle in his analysis of the nature of the mind. Unlike what Brentano, Husserl, and other continental philosophers presumed for intentionality, Searle did not equate the study of intentionality and the study of consciousness in an absolute way. For Searle, these are two different but equally important fields; but for Husserl, the study of consciousness is the study of intentionality. The reason for this difference lies in their different prescriptions for the relationship between intentionality and consciousness (Searle, 1990). Husserl specified intentionality early in his thought as an intrinsic feature of all conscious experience, as an a priori character of consciousness. However, in Searle's original consciousness and intentionality specification, he did not consider intentionality as a fundamental feature of consciousness. Only some consciousness possesses Intentionality, and they contain beliefs, fears, hopes, etc. Simultaneously, there are also some non-intentional

consciousnesses; for example, my nervousness and undirected anxiety are not about anything. Various kinds of Intentionality discussed were compared in Table 1. As Searle pointed out, situations that satisfy the conditions of visual experience (i.e. specific scenes or events in the external world) will inevitably trigger visual experience. This means that the occurrence of visual experience is not arbitrary, but strictly constrained by the external world. Only when there are strong enough stimuli in the external world that can be captured by our senses and converted into neural signals, can we ‘see’ the corresponding content. This mechanism that satisfies the conditions ensures the authenticity and reliability of the visual experience, enabling us to perceive and understand the external world through vision.

Table 1. A comparison of some of the formal features of the Intentionality of seeing, believing, desiring, and remembering

	Seeing	Believing	Desiring	remembering
Nature of the Intentional component	Visual experience.	Belief	Desire	Memory
Presentation or representation	Presentation	Representation	Representation	Representation
Causally selfreferential	Yes	No	No	Yes
Direction of ft	Mind-to-world	Mind-to-world	World-to-mind	Mind-to-world
Direction of causation as determined by Intentional content	World-to-mind	None	None	World-to-mind

Source: Searle, J. (1983) *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge University Press.

In Searle’s view, the critical criterion for determining whether consciousness has an intentional object or not is not whether the consciousness directs to an object. We see the conscious experience of imagining, or stating, for example, that “the King of France today is bald,” which is intentional in Husserl’s view, yet non-intentional in Searle’s argument. Searle’s primary basis for this distinction is that consciousness is not intentional when it points to a non-real object (Searle, 1991). Intentionality is a fundamental characteristic of human thinking, which not only exists in fantasies and imagination, but also runs through various mental activities

such as perception, memory, thinking, desires, and beliefs. These intentional states each point to different contents, some based on real-world objects (such as perception), while others are entirely derived from inner creation (such as fantasy). Therefore, intentionality is not limited to a specific type of “intended object”, but exhibits great universality and diversity. In his view, there is no such thing as a consciousness that points intentionally to such objects because “they have a propositional content which that nothing satisfies, and in that sense, they are not ‘about’ anything.” Imagine that this type of consciousness may be about some object of consciousness, but it does not point to a real object, then it does not possess some satisfiable condition (Searle, 1993). Searle divides the two kinds of intentional consciousness that point to different ontologies into *intensionality-with-an-s* which is a property of a certain class of sentences, statements, and other linguistic entities, and an *intentionality-with-a-t* is a characteristic of the mind (brain) (Intentionality). Therefore, whether it meets the conditions is a criterion for judging whether an intentional consciousness is a complete intentional consciousness (Anscombe, 2020). A critical difference between his theory of intentionality and the traditional theory of intentionality is that he does not explain intentionality through representation (whether this consciousness is directing something), instead he explains intentionality through satisfaction. To explain consciousness through representation would fall into Dennett’s “progressively stupider homunculi!” dilemma. Thus, distinguishing between Husserl’s and Searle’s theories of intentionality by discussing whether they point to an object is, at least for Searle, an inadequate approach. Vague statements cannot simply conceal the differences between Husserl’s and Searle’s accounts (Li, 2010).

Husserl, in his *Logical Investigations*, thinks of the act of consciousness intentionally directed to an object as a composite structure, a structure containing two types of conscious acts, one objectifying, and the other non-objectifying. An objectifying act is an object-constructed act, while a non-objectifying act directs to an object based on the object constructed. For example, I can evaluate an object, which is a composite act of consciousness, i.e., my consciousness constructs an object of consciousness at the same time and points to it intending to evaluate. Imagining or stating fictitious facts are intentional acts that incorporate both acts of consciousness. Thus, Husserl thinks about the intentionality of consciousness based on object construction. A conscious and intentional act as initially directed to an object is constructed based on intentional causation. All consciousness as intentional consciousness, whether it is fictional or it directs to a real object, whether imagined or stated, always has evidence of the object to which it refers. The fact that consciousness possesses an object explicitly means that it has a certain degree of fulfillment. But no state of consciousness can be fulfilled; it always has both an empty symbolic intention and a full intention that enables the object to be pointed to explicitly. Husserl specifies how consciousness intentionally points to an object, in this case as intuition (Moran, 2013). To equate Searle’s concept of Satisfaction with Husserl’s concept of fulfillment would undoubtedly

be a mistake on the level of comparison; Searle's account of satisfaction is at least corresponding to Husserl's account on the level of intuition and clear visibility, which is a foundational concept. Husserl discusses the object orientation of intentional consciousness in the mode of consciousness construction through intuition; Searle discusses intentional consciousness based on the concept of satisfaction in the causation.

Literature review

Intentional consciousness is consciousness about an object - in intentional consciousness, there is always an object already present in consciousness. In Searle's account, the ability of consciousness to intentionally direct to an object is called representation, and the fact that an object is given to consciousness definitively indicates that the representation is satisfied. The questions we need to clarify here are: 1, what is the satisfaction of intention? 2, what is the given object that fulfills satisfaction, i.e., what is the condition of satisfaction?

Searle's analysis of intentionality follows from his earlier theory of speech acts. In his view, speech acts are typical intentional acts, thus it is the best path to analyze the structure of Intentionality regarding speech acts. Thus, we can say that the satisfaction of the consciousness of intention is similar to the success of doing something with words (Wittgenstein, 1981). It is the real world's object that confirms the intentional "directing" in a certain way, thus it comes true. The so-called condition of satisfaction then corresponds to the truth value of verbal statements. The most important reason why an intentional consciousness that points to a fictional object is incomplete satisfaction is that such an intention does not have a condition of satisfaction; it can neither be verified nor falsified.

The previous analysis shows that Searle limits the scope of intentional acts to a portion of acts. He does not take intentional acts as Husserl does, as an ongoing identity synthesis of objects. His account of intentionality developed from the truth-value theory of speech acts. The satisfaction of intention means that the corresponding object of intention is verified. How to verify? It requires us to answer the second question further.

If satisfaction means the verification of an object, then there has been a prior apprehension of an intentional consciousness object. In Searle's view, the object that can satisfy intentional consciousness is indeed already determined intrinsically by intentional consciousness, i.e., The normativity of beliefs is also reflected in their correspondence with the real world. A true belief should accurately reflect the facts or states in the real world. In the belief of "it's raining", believers form an accurate understanding of rain phenomena in the real world through sensory experience, weather forecasts, or other reliable sources of information, and establish their own beliefs based on this. This correspondence not only reflects the objectivity of beliefs, but also emphasizes the importance of beliefs

in guiding human behavior, decision-making, and cognitive processes. Intentional consciousness, in its representation, represents the conditions under which this intention is satisfied, and the conditions of satisfaction are embedded in the content of intentional consciousness as intentions. A visual experience is satisfied only when there is a real object in the state of affairs as perceived in the visual experience (As shown in the Figure 1).




Figure 1. Intentional consciousness

We must misunderstand what object can satisfy the content. In the traditional subjective idealism and the usual understanding of intentionality, the understanding of intention satisfaction will have such a deviation: in intentional consciousness, our consciousness directs to an object; in this case, what consciousness experiences are the object itself rather than the experience about the object. The most typical representative of this view is Berkeley's subjective idealism. In an ordinary sense, we are also accustomed to considering the content of intentional awareness in this abstract way of thinking (Dreyfus, 2000).

In abstract rational awareness, we abstract an object that is isolated before our consciousness, decompose the experience of this object into a combination of various perceptual elements, and finally, consider this object of consciousness to be a combination of these already decomposed elements again. In Searle's view, this is not the case with our original experience of things: first of all, we always experience the object in some background; the object presented in conscious experience, i.e., the object that satisfies intentional consciousness, is not a physical object held together by various perceptual elements, but a fact presented in the background. When I observe or view, I have some perceptual experience of visual content, but that is not all there is to the experience of looking at this intention. If I analyze this experience directly, we find that the viewer not only has the experience of, for example, color and shape but also instantly sees the object itself, which is not the same as the perceptual visual experience. Strictly speaking, what the viewer "sees" directly is not the perceptual content but the object "hidden" behind the perceptual content (Dreyfus, 2001). And, "Visual experience is never simply of an object, but rather that it must always be that such and such is the case. Whenever, for example, my visual experience is of a station wagon it must also be an experience, part of whose content is, for example, that there is a station wagon in front of me. When I say that the content of the visual experience is equivalent

to a whole proposition, I do not mean that it is linguistic but rather that the content requires the existence of a whole state of affairs if it is to be satisfied. It does not just refer to an object.” What the viewer sees is a such-and-such fact instead of an abstract object. This such-and-such fact contains two aspects of content, which correspond to two separate conditions of satisfaction (Bauer, 2016).

First and foremost, Searle explains this following the truth-value condition analysis of the proposition. There is such a real object, and the reference itself does not have the condition of truth-value simply directing to an object, and it becomes true only when the corresponding object exists. In visual experience: “see” directing such a real object is a complete and satisfying view. According to Searle’s example, if a proposition expresses visual experience, “I have a visual experience about (a yellow wagon),” the state of consciousness expressed in this proposition lacks the reality of intentional satisfaction. Therefore, it is not a complete consciousness of intention. It cannot accomplish the task of giving a specific real object to the viewer. The other relative proposition, “I have a visual experience (that is, there is a yellow station wagon),” is a complete expression of this visual experience.

The object that satisfies intentional consciousness is a real object, there is a need for the real intention in the satisfaction condition of intention. The determination of reality is a necessary and fundamental element of intentional behavior. Intentional consciousness “have conditions of satisfaction, for conditions of satisfaction are always that such and such is the fact.” A unicorn is not a real object, on Searle’s account, it does not satisfy any intentional consciousness while a horse exists in reality and it satisfies any intentional consciousness of a horse (As shown in the Figure 2). As there is no King in France, thus the statement “The King in France is bold.” has no direction of fit. This condition of satisfaction is basic because any intentional experience is an experience directed to an object. Searle, like Husserl, believes that there must be a basic core in every intentional behavior. Searle thinks about this core through satisfaction. The position of satisfaction in Searle’s philosophy is the same as conscious behavior that sets existence in Husserl’s philosophy.




Figure 2. Conditions of satisfaction for intentional consciousness – Reality

Secondly, the object is presented as a state of affairs in the situation; it is not as a state of being recognized but as a state of affairs related to practice. According to Searle's example: "When I see a yellow station wagon the visual experience itself is also yellow, and in the shape of a station wagon the visual experience itself is also yellow and in the shape of a station wagon. Just as when I believe that it is raining, I do not literally have a wet belief, so when I see something yellow, I do not literally have a yellow visual experience. One might as well say that my visual experience is six cylindered or that it gets twenty-two miles to the gallon as say that it is yellow or in the shape of a station wagon." The condition of satisfaction in the content of the requirements of intentional consciousness is never a purely perceptual content presented in cognition, but always a content presented in the specific practices – facts (As shown in the Figure 3). Therefore, another primary content intended to satisfy the condition is the content that appears in a specific practical scene. The appearance of this content is bound to the practical situation of the viewer. The ancient Chinese fable – the blind men touching the elephant, the elephant they perceive is completely different.




Figure 3. Conditions of satisfaction for intentional consciousness – State of affairs

We can conclude that reality and state of affairs are the two major conditions for intentional satisfaction, and they exist internally in every intentional consciousness. The content of the requirement for reality is undoubtedly more basic, and the state of affairs presented is based on the satisfaction of reality. Searle's understanding of this is based on the base of modern philosophy. At the beginning of *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein stated that "the world is the sum of things." the latter part of his philosophy of language shifts to find answers in the philosophy of everyday experience. Normally, Searle's philosophy of mind continues this path down.

However, Searle's argument is still in danger of being taken as traditional subjective idealism because it imposes the possibility conferred by reality to consciousness. Is it possible that the real world is independent of consciousness? If so, how is it independent of consciousness but constructed by intentional acts of the conscious? This question will be answered in the analysis of intentional causality.

Methodology

From the analysis of visual experience, we can see that intention's condition of satisfaction is in the content of intention. Therefore, in visual experience, what satisfies intentional consciousness, in other words, what appears in the viewer's field of vision, is already internally "determined" by intentional consciousness. In a visual scene, the viewer can see many things, but these things are presented as objects in particular states of affairs. The state of affairs in which they are presented as objects is already inherently determined by intentional experience. Intentional experience is determined by personal experience. Searle refers to this intrinsically determined object and the intentional characteristic presented by the corresponding state of affairs as the self-referential characteristic of intentional experience. There is also an intention to satisfy the reality of the state of affairs, that is, the direction to the satisfaction of the object's requirements, which is the basic element that makes the intentional experience a complete experience of the facts. This satisfaction requirement for the reality of the state of affairs is satisfied in the experience of the state of affairs as a kind of "Cause" visual image. Therefore, any kind of intentional representation experience has at least one characteristic: "the world must be as it visually seems to me that it is, and it's that way must be what causes me to have the visual experience which constitutes its seeming to be that way. And it is this combination that I am trying to capture in the representation of the Intentional content".

The experience of "causation" is obtained from the cause of a cause to an effect, which is also an experience of causality. Since intentionality itself has the requirement of satisfying reality, people with intentional awareness have always had an interactive relationship with the world. In Searle's view, intentionality belongs to consciousness, and causality belongs to the world. Thus "perception is an intentional and causal transaction between mind and the world." Searle further defined the content of this intentional experience as "causally self-referential".

Immediately after introducing the concepts of causation and intentional causality, Searle raises a related quandary: "What is the sense of 'cause' in the above formulations, and doesn't this account have the skeptical consequence that we can never be sure our visual experience is satisfied since there is no neutral position from which we can observe the causal relation to see that the experience is satisfied?" Since we divide the entire emerging universe into two regions, consciousness and the real world, how can the causal events that occur in the world be perceived by the consciousness inside? Therefore, doesn't the problem of causality proposed by Hume also exist in the theory of intention?

Searle had a detailed critique of the traditional conception of causality in *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, pointing out its five shortcomings and followed it up with corresponding constructive opinions. But

we will focus only on the part relevant to the topic here and only on Searle's response to Hume's causal dilemma.

This study will systematically review the literature related to the intentionality theory of philosophers such as John Searle and Husserl, particularly Searle's theoretical framework on intention satisfaction and causal experience. Through literature review, clarify the development context, core concepts, and main viewpoints of the concept of intentionality, laying a solid theoretical foundation for subsequent research. At the same time, we will compare the similarities and differences between Searle and Husserl in the theory of intentionality, analyze the differences in understanding intentionality from different philosophical perspectives, and provide a theoretical perspective for subsequent empirical research. Discourse analysis will be one of the important methods in this study, by delving into the original works, academic papers, and commentaries of Searle and other philosophers, to uncover the deep logic and implicit meanings behind their theories. Especially regarding Searle's discourse on intention satisfaction, a detailed textual interpretation will be conducted to analyze the logical chain, key concepts, and theoretical assumptions of his theoretical construction, providing direct textual basis for understanding its sociological significance.

In order to verify and deepen the conclusions of theoretical analysis, this study will design a series of empirical studies. Specifically, empirical data on human behavior, social interaction, and intentional satisfaction can be collected through methods such as questionnaire surveys, in-depth interviews, and case studies. The questionnaire survey will target the general public and specific groups (such as psychologists, sociologists, etc.) to understand their understanding and application of the concept of intentionality. In depth interviews focus on how individuals use intentionality to understand and explain behavior in their daily lives and social interactions. Case studies select representative social phenomena or events and analyze in depth the role of intentionality in them. After collecting empirical data, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods will be used for analysis. Quantitative analysis mainly uses statistical software to process questionnaire data and analyze the differences and similarities in intentional understanding among different groups. Qualitative analysis involves in-depth exploration of interview and case data through methods such as content analysis and topic coding, to extract the specific manifestations and mechanisms of intentionality in social interaction. On this basis, a sociological model of intentional satisfaction is constructed to reveal the causal logic and operational mechanism behind it. From the analysis of visual experience, we can see that intention's condition of satisfaction is in the content of intention. Therefore, in visual experience, what satisfies intentional consciousness, in other words, what appears in the viewer's field of vision, is already internally "determined" by intentional consciousness. In a visual scene, the viewer can see many things, but these things are presented as objects in particular states of affairs. The state of affairs in which they are presented as objects is already inherently determined by intentional experience.

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Results

Hume's questioning of causality is mainly on the legitimacy of its objective existence as a necessity and questions the legitimacy of the existence of causality. In Hume's view, cause and effect are equivalent to one thing A that happens, which makes another thing B happen. However, we can only perceive the sequence of events one by one. Therefore, we only perceive the continuity of the practical sequence but not the continuity of the events themselves. As for the cause and

effect relationship that A affects B and A is B's cause, we are used to perceiving the progress of events in such a sequential way in our life. Therefore, the causal connection is ultimately not a connection in the objective world but a subjective sequence fundamentally contingent. Simultaneously, in the sequence experience, we, in principle, cannot obtain the experience of causality but can only obtain the sequence's regularity. Hume's statement happens to oppose our common-sense view of cause and effect because we believe that specific sequences of events exist in our daily lives. Searle believes that the intentional experience can solve Hume's problem.

Two solutions work for the doubt. First, A may indeed affect B, that is, A triggers B, which is experiential; Second, the effect is an "objective" existence. Searle puts forward for himself two tasks when discussing "Intentional Causality" in Chapter 4 of this book: 1. to intentionalize causality – cause-effect does exist; 2, naturalize intention – cause-effect is of objective reality.

For the first problem, Searle takes cause-effect as a fact that can be observed directly in your experience instead of a law inferred by reason. We can directly experience the triggering effects of certain things in our lives without inference, such as drinking water when we are thirsty, and, without inference, we directly know the truth of the opposite fact. The recognition of the existence of such direct experience is also not in conflict with the recognition of the existence of causal laws. These two causal connections are relatively independent.

The causal connection observed through direct experience is not a random combination of sequential connections. There is a certain degree of logic and internal connection between the experienced cause and the effect. For example, Searle says that boiling water caused by boiling is a proper causal sequence, while what Sally did (such as boiling water) caused the phenomenon that John saw (such as boiling), which could not be regarded as a particular causal sequence. The Statement "X causes Y" is extensional, and only statements of the form "X as a cause triggers the effect Y" is intensional. "There is a logical or internal relation between the description of the cause and the description of the effect in our examples is that in every case there is a logical or internal relation between the cause and effect themselves since in every case there is an Intentional content that is causally related to its conditions of satisfaction." Therefore, it is the direction and satisfaction in intentional consciousness that make the causal connection possible.

However, this is not to say that an intentional awareness connects the two things from the outside to become a sequence of actions. Rather, the cause and effect have always been a continuous whole in the intentional experience, but this intentional experience needs to be satisfied. "In each case, cause-effect are related as intentional presentation and conditions of satisfaction." More precisely, we are experiencing a whole sequence of cause-and-effect triggers in each intentional experience. Therefore, in intentional experience, we all have a whole sequence of experiences from cause to effect. Hence, causality is intentional causality, which

we directly experience, and is inherent in any intentional experience. “The case that one often has an experience of causation, but indeed every experience of perceiving or acting is precisely an experience of causation.” Hume’s quandary’s main problem is that it ignores the direct experience of causality itself, while it only takes the provisions of the causality as causality. Even Hume later uses “habit” to bridge the gap between the divided events, and he still fails to avoid skepticism. Hume’s followers tried to use force, efficiency, and other things to communicate the sequence of events, but they could never find this type of perceptual object. And according to Searle, “there all along as part of the content of both perceptive experiences and experiences of acting.” The nature of conscious intention determines that there is irreducible causality in our experience itself.

The biggest difference between habit and intention consciousness in the perception of our causal sequence is that through the former, we only passively obtain the correlation tendency between events; If consciousness is understood as intentional, the connection between events and the tendency we get about something always has been incorporated into our initiatives. Searle deals with the naturalization of Intentionality by explaining this question.

Searle employs intentionality in the discussion of causality, in which the subject can manifest the cause and effect instead of being ascribed the causality. He does not accept a Kantian way and regards causality as a transcendental category of knowledge necessary to construct knowledge. As what appears in intentional consciousness, causality is gradually constructed in one’s cognition. Our intentional causality in the world is gradually established and justified. “The point is not how we come by the belief that cause is a real relation in the real world, but how we might be justified in holding that belief, how we as empiricists might rationally believe that causation is a feature of the real world in addition to regular recurrence.” Searle is reasoning that our belief in reality in obtaining causality is realized in a dynamic process. It does not work to take causality as congenital. The correct situation is that, firstly, certain causal intentions are satisfied and confirmed in our life experience; then as the scope of this satisfaction expands, we will then establish beliefs about the world itself as cause-effect and the law of causation (As shown in Figure 4). This is a process of gradual realization, in which we do not immediately believe in the reality of cause and effect, nor do we immediately deny it. Undoubtedly, what we see in reality is such a situation – the belief that the world exists as causality is gradually justified, and accordingly, the corresponding intention is satisfied and the belief in it gets stronger.




Figure 4. Cause and effect perceived as a whole action

Discussion

The process of constructing the belief of real causation begins in our infancy. Searle believes that this process can be described by two concepts: manipulation and trial and error. He also borrows Piaget's concept of "aid relationship" to demonstrate his point of view. People have various attempts at cognitions and practices in the world when they are in infancy, and they must use an intermediary to accomplish their goals. The aid of the process is the process of trying to manipulate something to achieve the goal. Suppose the aid used successfully satisfies a kid's purpose, in that case, the aid itself can be deposited in consciousness as a component of the action's intentional satisfaction conditions. According to Searle's example, children find that they can break a vase with stones. As long as such a thing can be repeated, the children can try to use their own hands. (Hands are usable and real parts of their body, which, as faith is also gradually acquired in life. Because according to the perspective of modern biology, the corresponding neural circuit is not born open.) With the aid of the stone, the purpose of breaking the vase is finally accomplished. The states of whole coherent actions are part of the conditions of satisfaction of the child's intention. After the goal is accomplished, the states of the actions will eventually settle in the consciousness. In general, as long as the child finds that he can manipulate a series of events to accomplish the goal, his intention content can be satisfied, and he can discover the causality that exists in the world.

Combining our previous analysis of satisfaction, we should also emphasize: in the process of justifying causal intentions, the complete conditions of satisfaction are not only certain results given to the child as the subject of the action but that the whole action is experienced. For example (Searle has cited many times), a patient with arm paralysis raises his arm under the action of electrical stimulation, yet he does not think that he raises his arm consciously. This process of raising the arm, due to lack of satisfactory condition, cannot be called a process of intention, and he is not the reason for raising his arm. The process of intention satisfaction inherently possesses the intention caused by the event.

The practical process of obtaining satisfaction through manipulation is, in principle, a process involving trial and error. The belief in causal connection

obtained through trial and error is not subjective or arbitrary. It must have already contained a certain degree of objective and independent elements. We can say that reality becomes an element of intentional causality in this process because intentionality is gradually satisfied in the practice of real nature, intentionality is also naturalized.

Searle has quietly changed our usual understanding of reality in his analysis. “The concept of reality is a causal concept... causes are part of reality, and yet the concept of reality is itself a causal concept.” So Searle’s understanding of reality cannot simply be confused with our usual understanding of reality; it does not simply mean the independence of something. Searle is rather clarifying, in our conscious experience, what is the source of something or the world that can be experienced as an independent existence—that is, intentionality, or more accurately, the satisfaction condition of intentionality. The concept of reality in this sense includes the subject’s more primitive understanding of reality.

Now we can conclude that: in this part, we see that since satisfaction is the satisfaction of the intentional needs of the whole situation, the basic element that makes the object of satisfaction a fact is “cause” (i.e. causality) as the core of intentional direction. We see that a complete intentional satisfaction cannot be complete without the satisfaction that triggers the experience, in which we gradually acquire beliefs about reality. Thus, causality is the basic element in intentional satisfaction, which makes intentional experience the basic element of about a real fact.

Conclusion

In conclusion, John Searle’s analysis of intentional satisfaction underscores the profound connection between consciousness representation and sociological dynamics. According to Searle, intentionality, characterized by the ability to represent consciousness, inherently involves satisfaction, particularly centered around the notion of causality. By placing causality at the forefront of intentionality, Searle delves into the fundamental realities of the world at a causal level, aligning his philosophy with biological naturalism rather than traditional subjective idealism. Through this lens, consciousness maintains an active engagement with the external world, perpetually navigating trial and error processes. This naturalistic stance, however, is far from simplistic or naive; it doesn’t merely assume external reality but instead justifies it through the experiential lens of consciousness. Moreover, Searle’s insistence on integrating causality within intentional consciousness distinguishes his position from phenomenology, emphasizing the necessity of causal discourse in understanding intentional content. While acknowledging differences in basic philosophical positions, particularly between Searle’s perspective and phenomenology, further comparative analysis remains imperative for deeper insights into the sociological implications of intentional satisfaction. Exploring

these nuances not only enriches our understanding of Searle's theory but also sheds light on the complex interplay between intentionality and societal dynamics, paving the way for fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue and research.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Sichuan Social Science Federation, "John Searle: Social Constructionism and Language". My gratitude goes to Professor Mike Hill, who paid countless efforts on conceptualizing the study.

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