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ENHANCING EFFICIENCY OF COALITION FACTION AND STATE AUTHORITIES INTERACTION IN UKRAINE

David ARAKHAMIA

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Enhancing Efficiency of Coalition Faction and State Authorities Interaction in Ukraine

David ARAKHAMIA¹

Abstract

In crisis conditions characterised by war, which leads to critical changes in the functioning of power structures and financial losses for all spheres of the state, political and economic instability, limitations of the legal regime of martial law, the issue of interaction between the parliamentary coalition and state authorities is acute. The overall efficiency of state administration and governance in Ukraine depends on the quality of such cooperation. The mono-majority of the Servant of the People presidential party in the parliament, which was formed as a result of the extraordinary parliamentary elections in 2019, although it simplifies the decision-making process, is a threat to improving the role of the coalition faction in the formation of the government, legislative activity and parliamentary oversight. This study aims to identify bottlenecks and critical factors of inefficiency by analysing the constitutional and legislative framework that regulates the duties of the coalition faction. This study aims to identify bottlenecks and critical factors of inefficiency by analysing the constitutional and legislative framework that regulates the duties of the coalition faction. Given the imperative for a systematic approach to legislative planning and the pivotal role of the coalition faction in parliamentary oversight, the significance of the influence of coalition France on the stability and efficacy of governance is evident. Positive developments in this direction will ensure the transparency and long-term effectiveness of the current government in Ukraine.

Keywords: parliament; government; parliamentary faction; single-party majority; coalition.

¹ Educational and Scientific Institute of Public Administration and Civil Service, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, UKRAINE. E-mail: d.arakhamia@gmail.com; ORCID: 0009-0004-8337-6181

Introduction

Currently, effective state management and governance, which strengthens the process of synergistic interaction between the parliamentary coalition and state authorities, is complicated in the conditions of a mono-majority in the parliament. The one-party majority in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is characterised by the advantage of the coalition presidential party “Servant of the People”, which has 254 mandates out of 450 possible. Such a coalition faction has significant influence, foremost, on the formation of the government and, in addition, controls legislative activity and parliamentary control.

Regarding parliamentary democracy, the coalition forms the optimal state policy to ensure effective interaction between the legislative and executive powers. In addition, the level of transparency and accountability of the government and the effectiveness of the management process in general directly depends on the quality of such interaction. An essential factor in this context is the ability of the parliamentary coalition to effectively form the government, manage legislative programmes, and control the government’s activities. This determines the general stability and function of the state.

The Constitution of Ukraine (1996) provides for the recommendation of candidates for the post of Prime Minister to the President and the appointment of members of the Cabinet of Ministers as duties of the parliamentary coalition. Nevertheless, in practice, the inadequacies in the current legal framework result in supplementary challenges in fulfilling these responsibilities, despite the initial clarity of the constitutional mandates. For example, the Constitution gives the coalition faction the power to propose members of the Cabinet of Ministers. However, the current state of procedural specifics will lead to potential inefficiencies in government formation. Such a situation necessitates a more adequate definition of such specifics.

In turn, the legislative activity of the coalition faction consists of the implementation of draft laws to achieve common political goals. Decision-making is accompanied by the coordination of actions between the members of the coalition factions and their interaction with other political forces. The Memorandum between the Verkhovna Rada and the European Parliament (2015) emphasised the need to increase legislative processes’ transparency, predictability and efficiency. Such cooperation is due to the need for the Verkhovna Rada to attract international support and experience to eliminate excessive legislative burden and ensure a more unified approach to planning legislative activity. These issues are relevant even after implementing the relevant reforms in 2019. Thus, the coalition’s ability to strategise and prompt implementation of legislative programmes is the main factor in the effectiveness of the parliament in resolving national issues, in particular economic reform, social security, the development and restoration of infrastructural support, and resistance to the consequences of war. Further

improvement of legislative procedures is essential for promptly resolving current problems and preventing new complications. Above all, the improvement should include increasing the participation of all stakeholders, including the Government and the President, in the legislative process from the beginning.

The process of verifying the legitimacy of the executive power is ensured by adequate supervision, which is ensured by the quality of the performance of the parliamentary control function by the coalition faction. The question of the effectiveness of such supervision is especially relevant under the conditions of parliamentary democracy, that is, clear accountability of the executive power to the legislature. In this context, the mechanisms of parliamentary control are outlined in the relevant legal acts and the Constitution of Ukraine. These mechanisms mainly include consideration of the programme of activities of the Cabinet of Ministers, holding question hours for the government, and consideration of government reports, but their effectiveness directly depends on the active and priority participation of the coalition faction.

Therefore, the effectiveness of state management and control primarily depends on the quality of interaction between the factions of the Ukrainian coalition and state bodies. This article aims to identify prospects for improving the public administration system in Ukraine by identifying directions for optimising the role of the coalition faction in government formation, legislative activity, and parliamentary oversight to ensure transparency, clear accountability, and overall government efficiency. To achieve the goal, legislative and procedural refinements are analysed in the work, making it possible to formulate recommendations for making amendments and implementing strategic improvements. Based on the work results, specific directions will be put forward to strengthen the ability of the coalition faction to manage effectively.

Literature review

The problem of improving interaction between coalition factions and state authorities in Ukraine remains a topical topic of research in the context of transformations in the country's political system. Because the coalition is an association of parliamentary factions, people's deputies include the majority of people's deputies from the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada (Chuba, 2016). Similar conclusions were also reached by Derkach (2018), Timkin and Novykova (2010), based mainly on the Law of Ukraine "On the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine".

Instead, the theory of constitutional law proposes to define a coalition of parliamentary factions as a voluntary, relatively stable union of parliamentary factions, which is formed in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine based on the results of the elections and the agreement of political positions to legitimise pre-election programmes by adopting relevant legal acts (Kulchytska, 2009). According to

Sovhyria (2014), the optimal agreement on the formation of a ruling coalition should include a clear definition of the political course of the new government, consultation procedures between coalition members, a decision-making mechanism, a complete list of ministerial appointments, key appointments outside the government, as well as the level of collective responsibility of the government.

Academic research on coalition governance highlights the complexities inherent in multiparty systems, where differing political agendas often stand in the way of constructive cooperation within a coalition. In particular, Babych and Tykhonchuk (2023) note that the main problem is the intra-coalition struggle, which is a refusal to cooperate or a conflict between members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine with common goals or interests. In this context, Barabash (2008) notes that the parliament's inability to adopt the budget within the prescribed period, which is the basis of constitutional and legal responsibility, is a crucial problem for countries in economic crisis. In addition, as noted by Batanova (2023), violations of the constitution and the emergence of insurmountable contradictions endanger the normal functioning of the parliament as a basis for constitutional and legal responsibility. In addition, in the conditions of war, the question of the legitimacy of state authorities in general and coalition factions arises, which is highlighted in the works of Ostapets *et al.* (2023), Kryvoshein (2024), and Belkin (2024), as well as in modern sociological studies of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) (Hrushetskyi, 2023a; 2023b). Thus, the analysed scientific sources indicate the need to improve the institutional mechanisms of interaction between coalition factions and state bodies and increase political culture and responsibility for the decisions made in Ukraine.

Methodology

In the course of this research, several general scientific methods of cognition were applied, in particular: (1) historical analysis was used to study changes in the composition and structure of the coalition and opposition in the Ukrainian parliament over the past 7 years; (2) comparative analysis was applied to study the peculiarities of coalition and opposition formation in the Ukrainian parliament during the prewar and wartime periods; (3) the doctrinal method of legal research was used to analyse laws, norms and regulations to identify gaps in the legislative regulation of the process of forming the government itself and its members; (4) functional-structural analysis was used to analyse the mechanisms of legislative activity, the organisation of the coalition faction's work, and the interaction process between the parliament, the government, and the President; (5) the systematisation method is applied to unify various aspects of parliamentary control, such as government reporting, Question Time for the government, and review of government programmes; (6) the generalisation method was used in structuring control procedures, including regulatory and legal frameworks and the role of parliamentary committees and coalitions, which made it possible to identify critical relationships between control elements.

Results

In modern conditions, political stability plays a decisive role in ensuring the effective operation of state authorities. The interaction between different political factions in parliament is significant and determines the state's ability to make essential decisions in critical areas of the country's development. However, changes in the coalition's composition, which is an indispensable component of the democratic process, can significantly affect the current functioning of the legislative power.

An example is the change in the composition of the coalition before the VI session (from February 6 to July 21, 2017) of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the IIX convocation, in particular, the withdrawal from the coalition "Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko" (RPL), "Self-Reliance" and "Motherland". As a result, only the factions "Block of Petro Poroshenko" (BPP) and "People's Front" (PF) remained in the coalition; the total number of deputies, of which there are 219, determined a number of debatable issues. Thanks to 27 non-factional deputies (11% of the coalition), 18 people's deputies from "Self-Reliance" (almost 8%), and 14 representatives of the RPL (6%), the Ukrainian parliament retains almost the same bipolar structure in terms of composition because the actual coalition now includes 236 deputies, and the average level of support for draft laws among the coalition partners is 83%. The actual composition of the coalition and the opposition in the Ukrainian parliament in the VI session is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Actual composition of the coalition and opposition in the Ukrainian Parliament

During the VI session, 61 laws were passed, among which 27 draft laws were identified as the most controversial. The analysis of the votes for these 27 laws

recorded the absence of a stable coalition majority – only 185 People’s Deputies showed a level of support for these bills of more than 85%. Deputies (93 people) also appeared, who cannot be attributed to either the coalition or the opposition. They supported a little more than half of the reform laws that were adopted during the VI session. Thus, it should be noted that the real opposition of this period was only the “Opposition Bloc” because all its deputies did not participate in effective voting. Moreover, although, in total, the opposition has 187 deputies and includes representatives of all factions and groups, the forces of the coalition prevailed.


Instead, according to the 2019 extraordinary parliamentary election results, the presidential party “Servant of the People” won a convincing victory. It received a record 254 mandates out of a possible 450, which made it possible to form the first mono-majority in the parliament in the independent and democratic history of Ukraine, and, as a result, there is no need to find compromises in personnel matters. However, after the start of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2024, although the risk of escalation of the conflict in the east had been present for eight years since the beginning of Russian aggression against the Ukrainian state, the parliament was forced to slow down its activities. In this period, the mono-majority factor was more often replaced by an informal coalition of the “Servant of the People” faction with the “For the Future” and “Trust” groups, which is monitored by the results of the votes.

Analysing the pre-war period, the interaction between coalition factions and state authorities was mainly aimed at solving internal socio-economic issues, reforming state institutions and stabilising the political situation. The priority areas of cooperation were the development of infrastructure, the fight against corruption, and the improvement of transparency in public administration. However, insufficient attention was paid to security and defence issues, which became one of the reasons for the need to review strategic approaches after the start of military aggression.

However, a positive wartime shift in the parliament was the official statement of the opposition faction in the VRU regarding the cessation of internal political enmity and the unification of the parliament into an informal “defence coalition” for the victory of Ukraine (Hvozdk et al., 2022). In addition, the faction of the former President of Ukraine and the current head of state, given the need to work together to strengthen the country’s security and defence capabilities, actively supports initiatives to reform the security sector, modernise the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), and attract international aid. Cooperation with other factions of the coalition and executive authorities focuses on implementing new defence strategies, strengthening infrastructure and increasing the training of military personnel. Also, an important aspect is the joint development of legislative initiatives to ensure stability in the face of the challenges of war.

Let us look at the current composition of the coalition and the opposition in the Ukrainian parliament. It is worth noting that the party of the President of Ukraine

has a mono-majority, and considering the results of the votes of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine during the ninth convocation, it can make decisions independently. This happens in 23% of cases, but other cases require the involvement of deputies from opposition factions and groups, as well as non-fiction deputies. The structure of the adopted laws by affiliation to factions of the Ukrainian parliament is shown in Figure 2.



Source: OPORA (2021)

Figure 2. The structure of adopted laws by factions of the Ukrainian Parliament

Optimising the interaction between the coalition faction and state authorities is essential for effective public administration and governance, particularly given the dynamics of a single-party majority. Here, we focus on enhancing three core functions of the coalition faction. Thus, the coalition faction is responsible for appointing the Prime Minister and other ministers (government formation), crucial in planning and executing legislative agendas (legislative activities), overseeing the Cabinet activities, and ensuring effective law enforcement and state policy implementation (parliamentary oversight).

By strengthening these three core functions, the coalition faction can significantly influence the stability and effectiveness of governance. Effective government formation ensures the timely appointment of a Prime Minister and key officials who can swiftly implement the coalition's policies. Robust legislative activities allow the coalition faction to prioritise and pass critical laws, addressing urgent

national issues like economic reform and social welfare. The coalition faction can hold the Cabinet accountable through diligent parliamentary oversight, ensuring that government actions align with legislative intent and public expectations. These improvements lead to a more efficient, transparent, and responsive government.

Government Formation

The Ukrainian Constitution recognises the parliamentary coalition as a distinct entity with constitutional powers to form the Government. Article 83 mandates that the coalition recommends Prime Minister candidates to the President and suggests Cabinet members to the Prime Minister. This role, detailed in part eight of Article 83, is the coalition's exclusive constitutional prerogative, establishing a crucial link between the coalition and the Government.

A parliamentary faction with a majority of deputies holds the rights granted to the coalition. Thus, this faction, acting as a coalition, can propose Prime Minister candidates and nominate Cabinet members, as Article 114 of the Constitution outlines.

The procedure for appointing the Prime Minister is set by Article 8 of the Law On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2024). The President nominates the Prime Minister based on the coalition's proposal within 15 days of receiving it. The empowered deputy by the coalition agreement signs this proposal. However, Article 9 of the Law must provide clear guidelines for the coalition to submit Cabinet member proposals, as Article 83 of the Constitution requires. Although the Constitution grants this power, the law only partially specifies the procedure. The lack of regulation has become more significant since the coalition faction began operating in 2019. Explicit legislative provisions for appointing Cabinet members would improve public administration's efficiency and transparency.

We propose legislative changes to clarify the procedures outlined in Article 83 of the Ukrainian Constitution and to enhance the efficiency of the parliamentary coalition, particularly the coalition faction in the case of a single-party majority. These changes aim to ensure legal certainty in appointing government members, a core principle of the rule of law.

The necessary amendments to Articles 8 and 9 of the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2024) include clarifying that the coalition faction's proposal for the Prime Minister is submitted to the President with the signature of the faction's head, or, if absent, the first deputy head or another authorised representative. Additionally, to update Article 9, we suggest specifying that the parliamentary coalition, or the coalition faction in the case of a single-party majority, submits proposals for Cabinet members to the Prime Minister of Ukraine.

Legislative Activities

The coalition faction leads the planning of legislative work and sets the parliamentary agenda. For effective lawmaking, parliamentary activities and strategies for implementing legislative changes must be predictable to all stakeholders. This approach should be part of a comprehensive parliamentary reform. Increasing transparency, predictability, efficiency, and openness in the Verkhovna Rada's processes was a vital objective of the 2015 Memorandum of Understanding between the Verkhovna Rada and the European Parliament on joint parliamentary support and institutional capacity building. The European Parliament's Needs Assessment Mission, led by Pat Cox, also emphasised the importance of strategic legislative planning (Cox, 2002).

Parliament faces several challenges in legislative planning, including ensuring effective interaction among bill initiators, providing high-quality analytical support during the planning stage, managing excessive legislative work (bill spam), monitoring the implementation of legislative plans, and needing more unified approaches to legislative activity planning.

To address these issues and improve efficiency, the Verkhovna Rada reformed its rules in 2019 to enhance the planning and systematisation of legislative activities (On Amendments to the Rules of Procedure, 2019). Following these changes, the Verkhovna Rada approves a legislative work plan based on the Speaker's submission and consolidated committee proposals. Committees submit proposals considering the Government's Activity Programme and the indicative legislative work plan. As a result of these changes, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the first plan of legislative work in 2020, which includes several issues that require priority settlement, namely: justification of legislative changes, tentative names and deadlines for submission of bills responsible for their development, and information on the sequence of changes (On the Plan of Legislative Work, 2020).

Although the plan contributed to the development of a systemic approach to lawmaking and was also allowed to ensure the appropriate level of quality and efficiency in determining government priorities, its formation requires, foremost, an increase in the effectiveness of legislative planning. This requires mainly the involvement of people's deputies, the Government, and the President. In addition, it should be noted that the participation of subjects with the right to legislative initiative should cover all stages of the planning process, from the preparation of government proposals to the formation of the agenda and the legislative activity of the planning committee.

Secondly, the Government and the President should have the opportunity to submit proposals to the parliamentary legislative work plan. Only the government has an indirect opportunity since committees propose legislative changes considering the Government's Activity Programme. The President, however, is effectively excluded from this process (Koliushko *et al.*, 2023).

Thirdly, according to the Verkhovna Rada's regulations, the legislative work plan is approved by the Coordinating Council, where a majority vote makes decisions. This majority should reflect the votes of the relevant parliamentary factions necessary for decision-making during plenary sessions. Thus, a plan is adopted if it receives support from factions representing at least 226 deputies. In practice, this means, in the case of a single-party majority, the coalition faction plays a decisive role.

Given the coalition faction's de facto critical role in approving the legislative work plan, we propose formalising the preparation process. More specifically, we suggest assigning a subdivision within the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat to coordinate the plan's development, monitor progress, report on implementation, and compile legislative statistics. The coalition faction's secretariat could provide organisational and analytical support for coordinating between the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the President's Office.

Additionally, we recommend structuring the legislative work plan according to relevant state policy directions. The plan should detail the basis for drafting each bill, such as aligning Ukrainian legislation with EU laws, fulfilling international obligations, implementing other regulations, or the proposer's initiative. The plan should be approved annually and adjusted for each parliamentary session. The coalition faction's secretariat, or another structural unit of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat, should compile the consolidated legislative work plan and submit it to the Speaker for approval at the Coordinating Council meeting with government representatives.

Parliamentary Oversight of Government Activities

One of the critical functions of a parliament, alongside lawmaking, is overseeing the executive branch's activities. This function is especially significant in countries where the President is directly elected by the public, as opposed to those where the Parliament chooses the head of state. Parliamentary oversight aims to ensure the effective functioning of public administration, the smooth operation of the executive branch, and the proper implementation of laws passed by Parliament. Effective parliamentary oversight can promptly identify and rectify deficiencies in government operations, thereby enhancing public trust in state institutions. Thus, parliamentary oversight is an integral part of the democratic process, ensuring a balance of power and the accountability of the executive branch to the legislature.

Parliamentary oversight over government activities requires specific organisational and legal forms and mechanisms established in the Constitution of Ukraine, the Law On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2024), and the Law On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2010). According to point 13 of part one of Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine (1996), the Verkhovna Rada is authorised to oversee the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Part two of Article 113 states that the Government is accountable and answerable to Parliament. The mechanisms of oversight warrant a closer examination.

One such mechanism involves reviewing and deciding on the approval of the Cabinet Activity Programme (point 11 of part one of Article 85 of the Constitution) and considering government accountability and the potential adoption of a no-confidence resolution against the Cabinet (Article 87 of the Constitution). These constitutional provisions outline a comprehensive mechanism of collective political responsibility of the Government to the Parliament, based on setting political goals for implementing state policy and evaluating their execution. Such procedural mechanisms for expressing no confidence in the government (vote of no confidence) are common in many countries, especially those ruled under parliamentary governance (UNPD, 2021: 17).

According to the constitutional theory and practice of political accountability, the Government's responsibility to Parliament should be to follow parliamentary oversight of government activities. Chapter 38 of the Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure addresses parliamentary oversight of the Government, detailing procedures for: (1) Reviewing the Cabinet Activity Programme; (2) Considering government reports and presentations; (3) Organising and conducting the government Question Hour; (4) Preparing and reviewing the government accountability.

According to the procedure, the Parliament reviews the Government Activity Programme a month after the Cabinet formation. Committees and parliamentary factions discuss the programme before being considered in a plenary session. The review period should be at most 15 days. The Prime Minister must personally present the programme and respond to questions from deputies. Parliament may approve the programme or send it back for revision following the review, but this can only happen once. If the Parliament does not reach a decision, the programme is rejected for at least a year until the subsequent resubmission. During this period, the Government operates without formal political guidelines or clear performance indicators, making it challenging to assess its actions against set goals.

Approving the Government Activity Programme is a crucial prerequisite for effective parliamentary oversight. The programme outlines the Government's main work directions during its tenure, providing a mandate to implement declared policies and ensuring the political legitimacy needed to achieve strategic goals. These goals should align with the coalition agreement or the priorities of the coalition faction. In 2020, the ninth convocation of the Verkhovna Rada did not approve the revised government programme, resulting in a government operating without an approved programme and a misalignment between parliamentary and governmental visions of crucial policy directions.

Therefore, the constitutional entity influencing the final decision on the programme approval must play a vital role in the discussion. This entity is the coalition of parliamentary factions or, in the case of a single-party majority, the

coalition faction. Currently, the Rules of Procedure only mention committees and parliamentary factions. Thus, it is necessary to amend the Rules of Procedure to grant the coalition faction priority in reviewing the Government Activity Programme and preparing the decision on its approval.

The next stage of parliamentary oversight over the Cabinet activities involves reviewing government reports and presentations on the progress and results of implementing the approved programme. The Cabinet submits reports on the execution of the state budget and the status of nationwide programmes in scientific, technical, social, economic, and cultural development. These documents must be prepared and submitted within specified deadlines to enable parliamentarians to exercise proper oversight over the Government.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine can initiate an extraordinary report from the Government on executing the approved programme at any time. This proposal can be made by the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, at least three committees, or 150 deputies (Law On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2010). Given the special status of the coalition faction in approving the Government Activity Programme, the Rules of Procedure should reflect the coalition faction's ability to initiate an extraordinary government report. This clarification would ensure timely parliamentary oversight and prompt response to any deviations in implementing government programmes.

The Prime Minister must personally present the government report during a plenary session. Based on the report review, the Parliament may deem the government activities satisfactory, semi-satisfactory with recommendations, or unsatisfactory. If deemed unsatisfactory, the Verkhovna Rada can pass a resolution expressing its lack of confidence in the Cabinet. In such a case, under Article 87 of the Constitution of Ukraine (1996) and Article 14 of the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2024), the Government must resign.

In addition, one more critical instrument of parliamentary control over the executive power should be outlined, namely the "Question Hour" for the government, which is systematic and ensures the accountability of the government due to the quick identification of shortcomings in its work and the ability to stimulate the prompt resolution of problems in the field of public administration. During the "Question Hour", which takes place every Friday during the plenary week, deputies can ask questions to government representatives. Furthermore, during this hour, government officials must respond to deputies' questions and comments regarding the implementation of government programmes, the current state of the country, and other pressing public policy issues. However, questions must adhere to a predefined theme, approved by the Coordinating Council at the start of the plenary week, often influenced by the coalition faction initiatives.

The primary aim of the Question Hour is to enhance government transparency and accountability to Parliament and the public. This procedure also improves interaction between the legislative and executive branches, promptly resolving

urgent issues. The Question Hour is a critical element of the democratic process, ensuring proper oversight of government actions and contributing to the effective functioning of the state apparatus within the public administration system.

Parliamentary oversight of the Government can lead to discussions about the Cabinet's accountability. According to Article 87 of the Constitution of Ukraine (1996), the President or at least 150 deputies can initiate a vote on the government's responsibility, requiring at least 226 parliamentary votes to pass a no-confidence resolution. Such a vote can be held only once per regular session (except the last one) and only a year after the government programme is approved.

Once the issue of government accountability is initiated, committees have four days to send questions to the Cabinet based on their areas of oversight. The Government has three days to respond. The issue is then discussed in a plenary session within ten days of the proposal.

During the plenary session, deputies can debate the government's performance and express their views. The Prime Minister and cabinet members must answer all questions and explain the measures taken to implement the government programme. If the no-confidence resolution gains majority support, the Government resigns, paving the way for forming a new Cabinet.

In addition to holding the Government collectively accountable, Parliament has the right to initiate the dismissal of individual Cabinet members, as outlined in point 12 of part one of Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine (1996). According to Article 18 of the Law On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2024), the Verkhovna Rada can dismiss a minister by accepting their resignation based on a proposal from the Prime Minister (or from the President in the cases of the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Defense Minister), or on its initiative. Such a proposal may be made, for example, if a minister's actions do not align with the Government's declared policies or the minister is not performing their duties properly.

However, the current procedure for dismissing Cabinet members lacks clear regulations regarding the role of the coalition faction or the coalition of parliamentary factions as a constitutional entity. This gap highlights the need to formalise the coalition faction powers to propose dismissing government members.

We propose to consider the legislative changes that determine the role of the coalition faction in the liberation procedure of the Cabinet members who are wondering to enhance the government's political responsibility to parliament and, at the same time, the efficiency of public administration as a whole. Among the legislative changes, the following should be distinguished kind:

- granting a coalition faction the right to initiate the dismissal of a member of the government by submitting a formal request to the Prime Minister or President (in the case of foreign ministers or defence);
- introduction of a clear justification for the release of the Prime Minister or President and signing of the chairman of the coalition faction, or, in the absence of the first deputy chairman or other authorised representative;

- to create a procedure for consultative meetings between the Coalition faction management and the Prime Minister to discuss the reasons for the release and its potential impact on the government's policy;
- to determine the terms in which the Prime Minister should give an official response to the request of the coalition faction and justify the reasons for the support or rejection of the minister's proposed dismissal;
- to consolidate the provisions on the possibility and procedure of initiating the dismissal of a member of the government during the plenary session of the Verkhovna Rada with a coalition faction;
- to include in Article 18 of the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2024) the position of the coalition faction on clarification of the procedure of dismissal of a member of the cabinet, which allows the Verkhovna Rada to reject a member of the cabinet on his initiative based on a proposal of a coalition of parliamentary factions during a general parliamentary coalition meeting or session of the coalition faction;
- to formalise the decision to dismiss the Government as a submission to the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, signed by the head of the coalition faction or, in their absence, the first deputy chairman or another authorised representative.

It should be noted that the work of committees in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is an essential aspect of the government's parliament. Committee supervision features are assigned to Point 3 of Part One of Article 11 of the Law on Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (1995). The liability of committees for monitoring the implementation of the Government Programme under the relevant powers is also defined in Article 25 of the said Law. Such committees provide adequate supervision of parliament and evaluate government activities in different sectors by conducting hearings and investigations of officials on the performance of duties and applications of legislation in the operations of state institutions (Linetskyi & Kryzhanivskyi, 2021: 288).

The structure of the Verkhovna Rada Committees is formed around critical areas of public administration. This provides specialised supervision of such committees by central executive bodies. This alignment mirrors the structure of the executive branch, where each ministry or agency is accountable for a specific sector, facilitating efficient oversight. However, committees are not tasked with overseeing the Government as a whole – which responsibility lies with the entire Parliament. This approach helps avoid conflicts of jurisdiction and upholds the principles of parliamentarism.

In many countries with parliamentary and mixed forms of Government, committees oversee the activities of central executive bodies. For instance, in European countries, committees are organised by public administration sectors, allowing effective oversight. However, significant legal consequences of such

oversight are generally rare. In presidential republics like the United States, committees can hold hearings and officials accountable (Zhuravlova, 2009: 43). Overall, strengthening the role of parliamentary committees in government oversight can lead to more effective and transparent governance, ensuring that executive actions align with legislative intent and public interest.

For Ukraine, it is crucial to consider global experiences and adapt them to the national public administration system. Committees should oversee the activities of relevant ministries and agencies, providing expert evaluations of their work without making personnel decisions, which remain the purview of Parliament and the President. Committees should primarily focus on delivering substantive assessments of ministries and officials, enhancing the professionalism of parliamentary oversight. Political evaluations of government activities remain the prerogative of Parliament and the President.

Discussion

The analysis of scientific literature, particularly works by Derkach (2018), Timkin and Novyкова (2010), emphasise the importance of forming coalitions based on precise political positions and norms laid down in legislation to achieve constructive cooperation. The study results in this article indicate the critical importance of parliamentary supervision carried out by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine committees because the supervision process is a crucial mechanism for ensuring the practical work of the executive power. In this context, it is necessary to reconcile the tasks within the duties of committees for professional supervision and compliance with the general powers of parliament. The practical work of committees is aimed at maintaining the balance of forces, preventing and avoiding conflicts, and ensuring the long-term stability of public administration. At the same time, Sovhyria (2014) emphasises the need for optimal regulation of the coalition formation process, which includes detailed agreements on the political course, decision-making mechanisms and the level of government responsibility.

In this context, our article revealed that considering international experience and various international management practices is a priority in strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring a sufficient level of transparency and accountability in the executive industry. In particular, the work of Batanova (2023) also reveals the need to apply the experience of other countries to reform the institution of constitutional and legal responsibility of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to prevent an imbalance of the branches of state power.

Our paper also notes that the coalition faction plays a crucial role in parliamentary oversight by Verkhovna Rada committees. In a single-party majority case, members of the coalition faction hold most leadership and ordinary positions in committees. According to part four of Article 81 of the Law On the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2010), the distribution of committee positions

is proportional to the size of the parliamentary faction. This grants the coalition faction significant influence over the committees' oversight functions, including setting agendas. Consequently, the single-party majority can effectively supervise government activities while supporting its political initiatives. In particular, in the 2019 elections, the Servant of the People presidential party formed a mono-majority for the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, which made it possible to avoid the need to involve other factions in making decisions on the formation of a coalition, as indicated in the study by Nadelnyuk (2017).

Establishing an effective parliamentary oversight mechanism over government activities, with a defined role for the coalition faction, is essential. This mechanism will not only strengthen parliamentary democracy in Ukraine but also ensure more effective public administration, reinforce parliamentarism and increase public trust in state institutions. In this context, the work of Babych and Tykhonchuk (2023) notes that avoiding intra-coalition conflicts and ensuring constructive cooperation is a crucial aspect of achieving this goal. The results of a survey conducted by KMIS in 2023 (Hrushetskyi, 2023a) show that the level of trust of Ukrainians in elected authorities is gradually decreasing; in particular, in December 2023, 62% trusted the current President (in December 2022, the figure was 84%), and the Verkhovna Rada – only 15% (previous confidence level was 35%). Despite the increased level of trust in these authorities before a full-scale invasion, the decline in trust in the central government is evident and is likely to continue. It should also be noted that trust in local authorities remains at a level of 50%, which reflects the stability of this trend in 2022. Despite this, another study (Hrushetskyi, 2023b) on the end of the term of office of the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada in 2023 showed that 81% of surveyed Ukrainians did not support holding elections during the war and agreed that they should be held after its end, and only 16% supported the opinion that elections should be held despite the war. Therefore, the gradual decline of the population's trust in the power structures casts doubt on the legitimacy of the coalition factions, indicating the need to revise the legislation on the formation and functioning of coalitions and to substantiate the procedures of their activities that meet military challenges. Despite the relative certainty of the population about the impossibility of holding elections, the effectiveness of the government, which does not have adequate public trust, can be jeopardised, which causes the need for legal adaptation to new conditions to ensure the stability and legitimacy of state institutions.

Conclusion

Given the dynamics of a parliamentary single-party majority, we examined critical areas for optimising the interaction between the coalition faction in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and state authorities, focusing on three main functions: government formation, legislative activities, and parliamentary oversight. To improve legal regulation for proposing government members, enhance the coalition faction efficiency, and ensure legal certainty, we propose amendments to the Law On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2024). These amendments would clarify the coalition faction's authority to submit the Prime Minister's candidacy to the President and propose Cabinet member candidates to the Prime Minister.

In legislative activities, formalising the procedure for the Cabinet of Ministers and the President to submit proposals to the Verkhovna Rada's legislative work plan is essential. The coalition faction's secretariat, as part of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat, should provide organisational and analytical support for coordinating the preparation and review of the legislative work plan among the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the President's Office.

Parliamentary oversight should be strengthened by granting the coalition faction priority in reviewing and preparing the decision on the approval of the Cabinet Activity Programme, initiating extraordinary reports from the Government on the execution of the approved programme, and proposing dismissals of individual Cabinet members. The coalition faction has to play a critical role in initiating no-confidence resolutions and conducting consultative meetings with the Prime Minister to discuss proposed dismissals, ensuring political accountability and alignment of government actions with coalition faction priorities.

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